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Jacques Derrida, in Of Grammatology, addresses Rousseau’s concept of the primitive outlined in 
the Essay on the Origins of Language.  In place of Rousseau’s classical derivation of language 
from the spoken word, Derrida famously proposes the mark or trace as a non-originary “origin”.  
This in turn leaves any notion of the primitive as ready for a deconstructive reading; that is, it 
posits that any notion of “the primitive” is a constructed (ie non-primitive) idea with a history 
and political intent. 
 
This paper will address to what extent does this theory of the mark and the questioning of the 
possibility of an origin present us with an essentially positive possibility of recasting 
architectural meaning outside a metaphysics which privileges the linguistic above certain of its 
“others”, for instance, materiality. 
 




The Paper Itself 
 
To begin.  This is what we are doing, now, at the outset of this paper; and this beginning is the 
whole question.  The question of the start, the origin, that which we think of as first, that from 
which other things are derived, that which we give ourselves as primary, as primitive. 
 
For “the primitive” is always given, and more particularly is always something we give 
ourselves, more of less knowingly.  And this gift – poison at the same time as present – as gift, 
destroys therefore the primitive as primitive, as origin.  Double meaning of the words “the 
given”: at once what we would like to think forms the basis, the ground, the fundament from 
which we spring; but in the same breath saying some  
event has occurred at this origin, that the origin gave itself or was given by some prior 
condition, was a choice, an action – in other words complex, that is, non-primitive. 
 
This a-logic of the gift is deployed in Derrida’s now classic text Of Grammatology, first in a 
theoretical matrix, and then put to the test in a reading of Rousseau’s Essay on the Origin of 
Languages.  Unlike some of Rousseau’s better known works (for instance, Discourse of the 
Origin of Inequality) the Essay on the Origin of Languages puts forward a relatively 
straightforward thesis – one that can be traced forward from Vitruvius, to Warburton’s Devine 
Legation, through Hobbes and Locke and thence via Condillac to Rousseau: the thesis that 
language and writing derive from the spoken word.  First comes speech, itself derived from 
expressive animal cries and made possible in the Vitruvian account by the gathering of people 
around the fire; then comes writing, following on from speech, derived from it, a tool for 
extending speech’s reach beyond the audible and acting as a prosthesis for memory.  Writing, 
as a tool for artificial extension and as prosthesis for memory, is a phenomenon that befalls 
language in a moment of effectiveness which is also and at the same time a moment of 
corruption.  The Platonic theme of the corruption of memory by writing in the introduction to 
the Timaeus is not far away. 
 
To generalise this schema in terms of a theory of signs:  spoken speech – here in the position of 
the primitive, that which is originary in this scenario – is the Signified, and writing comes as the 
Signifier, the sign, as that which does the signifying of the signified, of speech.  In this classical 
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schema, which is the basic schema of Western metaphysics as a logocentric (that is: speech- 
and meaning-orientated) philosophical system, the signified has the place of the primary, the 
primitive, the origin,  and the signifier is the derivation from that primitive beginning, that which 
befalls it or the cause of its fall into complexity and artificiality.  Primitive, primary, signified; 
derived, artificial, secondary signifier.  Relating to Rousseau’s Essay, primary speech as that 
which has defined man in his humanity and which distinguishes him from the animal and its 
meaningless cries; followed by its sign, the written word, that which is added as a 
supplementary tool to language itself (ie speech), a tool which gives (logic of the gift here again) 
both positive possibilities and which poisons the original purity of speech and corrupts memory, 
making it lazy. 
 
Now, as we know, what Derrida does is to question this structure of signified-signifier, speech 
and writing.  Since, as Bertrand Russell notes somewhere, there is no way of ascertaining 
whether at the outset of “real” humanity speech did “in fact” precede writing; since the 
assertion that it did is precisely that, an assertion and no more;  since the decision to make 
speech primary, to put speech in the place of the primitive, is a decision that is made on the 
basis of a certain not disinterested logic, then what of this interest?  What if our interest is to 
question this logic, to reveal it as, precisely, interested, and reveal the nature of this interest? 
 
Derrida does this by an apparent inversion. He proposes the mark or the trace as the primitive, 
as at the origin, in place of speech.  He proposes, that is, he gives himself the thought that, he 
wagers for.  This deconstructive move is more complex – indeed something other than – a mere 
inversion, however.  He does not simply take the terms of the structure speech/writing and then 
invert them.  What is being called into question in the deconstructive moment is the very order 
of the sign.  For the mark, the trace, the scratch, is not taken to have a meaning.  What is 
being proposed is not the substitution of one locus of meaning  - namely speech – by another – 
namely writing as the bearer of meaning.  That is why the term archi-writing is sometimes used.  
The figure of communication, of the transmission of meaning, is being inverted here at the same 
time.  What is proposed is that the primary position of the signified be called into question.  The 
trace or mark is not a bearer of meaning, but is rather the very possibility of the sign; the 
signifier, that which classically is thought to come afterwards, is given by Derrida the status of 
origin, of the primitive. 
  
And thus the primitive, per se, is destroyed.  We are given here no substitute origin.  Or rather, 
the origin is a sort of non-originary origin, a bastard origin, always already complex, split, 
divided, non-pure – always already eventful. 
 
With this, any notion of the primitive, of origins, is revealed as being a constructed idea, ie 
essentially non-primitive – with a history to it and as political intent.  Notions of the primitive 
wish to present themselves as innocent, natural, unquestionable, clear, beyond debate;  The 
deconstructive mode will always call this innocence into question, will always demand that it 
show its interest, relate to us its political intent.  The “natural” acts, as Derrida says elsewhere, 
as a neutraliser, a force of neutralisation, a method of bringing us to the point of non-
questioning, that is, to the point of the basis, the primary; and this force of neutralisation is 




Is meaning an issue for architecture?  Is there such as thing as architectural meaning, and does 
it necessarily operate as an effective regulating ideal for design or critique?  If we take up 
Andrew Benjamin’s recently articulated challenge to take Semper seriously when he says that to 
be a great artist, one must avoid or get beyond the issue of meaning; or if we are to take 
serious Peter Osborne’s recent questioning of the apparent hegemony of a sort of 
“hermeneutical utilitarianism”, as he called it – that is, the notion that, somehow, the more 
meaning we have the better it is for us; then does this land the architect or the critic in anything 
other than a realm where it appears that architectural design is nothing more – in essence- than 
the manipulation of form – the position that Benjamin appears to take.  if architectural meaning 
is called into question as a just, ethical and proper concern of the architect, then can that leave 
us anywhere other than in an apparently sterile formalism? 
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The question seems inescapably framed in terms of a form/content or form/meaning dichotomy; 
that is, in terms of an overly literary and linguistic account of meaning.  Meaning, as a concept 
– perhaps as the  concept - is caught within the logocentric structure Rousseau outlined.  For at 
least two reasons: 
 
•  the form/content or form/meaning structure which both defines meaning in its 
opposition to form and is meaning itself as the interrelationship between form and 
meaning, is the same structure operating in the same way as the signified/signifier, 
where the form of the sign (its signified/signifier structure) is opposed to its content 
or meaning (the signified side of that structure) 
•  to think meaning is always to think it on the basis of a notion of the originary, the 
primitive.  Without the primitive, without that to which the movement of signs can 
be related back, the play of signs becomes un-stoppable or unstopped, manic, 
ungrounded, meaning less.  Hence the concern of certain of our colleagues firstly to 
explicate the pre-modern chain of being where the actions and structure of the 
world in which we live was related back to an overarching relatively stable structure 
and from thence to the still point of a godhead; and then, acknowledging that this 
schema is no longer available, re-casting the structure and relating it back to a 
primary – that is, essentially primitive – reality of the Husserlian phenomenological 
life-world.  Rykwert, for instance, in the last paragraph of his 1972 book On 
Adam’s House in Paradise, does precisely this 
 
It is the questioning of the ultimate validity of Husserl’s concept of the lift-world – that is, the 
questioning of the very premises (ie primary groundings of) phenomenology, which was 
Derrida’s concern from his doctoral thesis on The Problem of Genesis in Husserl’s Philosophy 
onwards.  And this questioning occurs along the same lines as that within Of Grammatology’s 
deconstruction of Rousseau’s notion of the primitive origins of writing and language – and this 
for essential , or let us say structural  reasons.  In placing Rousseau’s signifier in place of the 
signified, what Derrida is doing, explicitly at times, is to throw down the gauntlet of the sign in 
front of Husserl’s wager for the ultimate meaning, the ultimate reference – that of the life-
world.  For Rousseau’s “speech”  is in the same structural position of “the primitive”, “the 
origin”, as Husserl’s phenomenological  life-world, and in raising the signifier to the position of 
non-originary origin, Derrida is taking Husserl’s crisis of signs, his crisis of representation, and 
treating it as the positive possibility of any discourse, any mark, any spacing, any work.  For 
deconstruction, as a [positive endeavour (the de as in desire, delight) takes the crisis of signs – 
the fear, possibility and actual phenomenon of the signifier becoming detached from the 
signified original meaning and running off, as it were, of its own accord in a sort of madness 
away from the daylight of meaning - a madness of the day – and gives us the thought that, 
without this crisis, without the inherent possibility of this crisis, there would be no sign, no 
possibility of meaning, and that in instigating meaning and the primitive we can do nothing else 
but try to cover over the derived and constructed quality of these so-called, so-desired origins. 
 
Thus Derrida will quote Husserl’s Ideas back at him at the end of his essay Speech and 
Phenomena, saying: 
 
  Everything has, no doubt, begun in the following way: 
 
  A name on being mentioned reminds us of the Dresden gallery…. We wander 
through the rooms…. A painting by Teniers… represents a gallery of paintings… 
The paintings of this gallery would represent in turn paintings, which on their 
part exhibited readable inscriptions and so forth (Ideas I, #100; p293) 
 
  Certainly nothing has preceded this situation.  Assuredly nothing will suspend it.  It is 
not comprehended, as Husserl would want it, by intuitions or presentations.  Of the 
broad daylight of presence, outside the gallery, no perception is given us or assuredly 
promised us.  The gallery is the labyrinth which includes in itself its own exits: we have 
never come upon it as upon a particular case of experience – that which Husserl 
believes he is describing….. 
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  It remains, then, for us to speak, to make our voices resonate throughout the 
corridors….. 
 
  And contrary to what phenomenology…… has tried to make us believe, contrary to 
what our desire cannot fail to be tempted into believing, the thing itself always escapes. 
 
And of course the thing itself is in the position of the ultimate primitive. 
 
It is not happenstance that it is the architectural figure of the labyrinth which is evoked here; by 
Husserl as a special example of the crisis of signs which we are to avoid, of a mise an abyme 
where the relation back to the fixed point of the day-light of the life-world can be guaranteed; 
and by Derrida as the general situation in which we and architecture finds itself.  Labyrinth as a 
sort of meaningless possibility of architecture, its possibility and a figure of it at the same time.  
For, to return to the mark or trace which is placed at the non-originary origin of language, this 
mark is not only the possibility of the sign or the elevation of the signifier over the signified, 
sign over meaning conventionally understood; this mark, one can argue, is spatial.  In contrast 
to the timely presence and simultaneity of what I am caricaturing as “literary” or “linguistic” 
meaning – that is, the co-presence, at the same moment as the utterance of the sign, of the 
meaning of that sign – the mark as a non-reified primitive, as the possibility of the sign and of 
language, is a possibility that occurs as the spacing of space.  The mark is not essentially 
spatial, because it works in differential fashion to give both space and time in an inherently 
complex moment of non-origin and thus operates beyond notions of essence – defined as that 
word is within the philosophical structures that the experience of the mark is intended to call 
into question.  But one can say that the mark, the scratch, the trace, cannot occur without 
evoking space in a manner that  evokes time in the same moment. 
 
We might then claim that this mark, in the dance of the movement of its non-origin, will begin 
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